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IN THE SUPREI1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---oooOooo---
DAVID R. WILLIN~S, dba 
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
HYRUM GIBBONS & SONS CO., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
:e!ORTH UTAH COMHUNITY T.V. , 
a Utah corporation, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 16,024 
---oooOooo---
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
************* 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to condemn one-tenth of an 
acre of unimproved real property in the Logan foothills 
for use as a radio-telephone transmitting and receiving 
base station to provide mobile telephone and paging 
service to the general public in the Logan area. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court held that appellant had the 
statutory power of eminent domain, but denied 
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appellant's right to have the particular site 
condemned for the reason that there might be some 
radio wave interference from appellant's equipment 
if it were improperly tuned on some occasions. 
THE NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court and hold that Plaintiff is 
entitled to have the site selected herein comdemned and 
that technical ~atters of radio wave consideration be 
deferred to the Federal Communications Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in numbered paragraphs 
to aid in referencing. 
1. Appellant, a Utah public utility, furnishes 
radio-telephone service to the general public in 
eleven Utah counties, and has furnished such radio 
common carrier regular and emergency services in Utah 
since 1965. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3; Tr. pp. 7, lines 
15-16, 23-24; 9, lines 11-25; 10, lines 1-9; 22, lines 
2-10; 54, lines 16-25; 55, lines 1-22; 95, lines 4-23.) 
2. Appellant's radio-telephone channels and 
equipment operation are authorized and regulated by 
the Federal Comn1unications Comn1ission, and appellant's 
service is regulated by the Utah Public Service 
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Commission. (Plaintiff's Ex. 2, 3; Transcript, 
pp. 9, lines 11-22; 20, lines 14-25; 21, lines 1-23.) 
3. In 1975 the Utah Public Service Commission 
authorized appellant to furnish radio common carrier 
telephone service in the Logan, Utah, area because 
of public need there. (Plaintiff's Ex. 2.) 
4. To provide "reasonable, adequate, efficient 
and continuous service" in the Logan area, as required 
by the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity order, 
appellant must obtain an appropriate site, one-tenth 
acre in size on which to locate a radio-telephone base 
station and antenna that interconnects with the Bell 
system. The site must be at an adequate elevation 
and in close proximity to the service area for the 
authorized low wattage radio signals to penetrate the 
major buildings in the service area, such as the Logan 
Hospital where physicians will receive emergency and 
business radio communications. (Plaintiff's Ex. 2; 
Transcript pp. 11-17; 31; 201, lines 6-25.) 
5. In selecting the Logan base station and 
antenna site, appellant's engineers studied 
extensively the terrain and topography of the Logan 
area, calculating distances and elevations, physically 
inspecting possible sites and examining existing 
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structures in the service area. They tested structures 
in other service areas similar to the Logan structures 
for signal penetration, using the same equipment to be 
installed and operated in Logan. (Transcript pp. 17, 
lines 2-10; 24, lines 14-25; 25-26; 27, lines 1-ll; 
28, lines 22-25; 33; 34, lines l-5; 49; 93, lines 
13-25; 94-95; 110; lll, lines 14-25; 112-113; 126, 
lines 3-25; 127; 128, lines l-8; 129-140; 146-148.) 
They also tested Sl;~al compatibility and possible 
interference for all other radio and television systems 
in Logan with similar signals in other service areas. 
(Transcript, pp. 18-20; 97; 101; 206, lines 2-25; 
351, lines 4-10.) Appellant made an economic 
feasibility study of the Logan service area in making 
a site selection. (Transcript, pp. 22; 24; 32; 41; 
108.) 
6. After making and repeatedly checking the 
testing and analysis described above over a period 
of several months, appellant was able to select only 
one site which could meet the coverage and penetration 
requirements for adequate service to the Logan area, 
which is the site in dispute herein. (Transcript, 
pp. 32, lines 4-6; 35, lines 2-6; 43, lines 10-18; 
44, lines l-7; 46, lines 9-19; 50, lines 9-25; 51-54; 
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63, lines 1-17; 99, lines 13-16; 110-111; 146, line 3; 
153, lines 3-8; 207, lines 2-15; 354, lines 1-11.) 
The site is vacant property and is adjacent to existing 
antennas and power poles larger than the one proposed 
by appellant, and is accessible to necessary electric 
power, telephone lines, and is on an existing road. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 9, 10; Transcript pp. 183, 10-14; 
207, lines 8-15; Defendants' Exhibit 1.) 
7. After the completion of evaluation and 
testing, appellant contacted respondent Gibbons, 
the owner of the site, and intervenor Community TV, 
who owns the adjacent antenna site. Intervenor 
initially had no objections to the proposed use of the 
site by appellant, and appellant began negotiations to 
purchase the same from Respondent. (Transcript, 
pp. 35, lines 7-25; 36; 37, lines 1-15; 38, lines 
20-25; 39; 40, lines 1-6; 98, lines 12-25; 99, lines 
1-12.) Respondent thereafter declined to sell the 
property because appellant and respondent could not 
agree on the value, and appellant began condemnation 
proceedings. 
8. After the action was commenced, intervenor 
changed its position and was allowed to be a party, 
and objected to the condemnation. (Record, p. 59.) 
9. The trial court determined that appellant 
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had the statutory power of eminent domain (Record, 
pp. 38-40, 57-58, 129.), but denied appellant's right 
to have the particular site condemned for the reason 
that there might be some radio wave interference from 
appellant's equipment if the same were improperly 
tuned on some occasions. All other conditions for 
condemnation had been met. (Record, pp. 128-133.) 
ARGUl1ENT 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT RIGHTLY DETERMINED 
THAT APPELLANT AS A PUBLIC UTILITY HAD THE 
RIGHT TO EXERCISE El1IHENT DOMAIN BUT WRONGLY 
DEtliED APPELLA."<T' S RIGHT TO OBTAIN CONDEM-
NATION OF THE PARTICULAR SITE. 
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The concept of wireless telephone companies 
has been recognized for some time by Utah statutes. 
Nonetheless, it may be helpful to review the background 
legal provisions. 
Appellant is a public utility and has acted in 
this matter pursuant to a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity granted by the Utah Public Service Commission. 
The telephone services provided by appellant, and to be 
installed in the Logan City area, are subject to both the 
Utah Public Service Commission and the Federal Com-
munications Commission, as indicated by a prior decision 
in this Court. Williams v. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 29 Utah 2d 9 (1972). As such, appellant is required 
to provide the best possible service to the public in 
the most economical and efficient manner. Id. 
The Legislature has defined those activities 
which are public utilities and subject to the Utah Public 
Service Commission in § 54-4-25, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
among which is "telephone corporation." "Telephone 
corporation" is defined in § 54-2-1(22), Utah Code 
Ann. (1953), as every corporation and person, 
owning, controlling, operating or maintaining any 
telephone line for public service within this state." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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A telephone line is defined in§ 54-2-1(21) as: 
... all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, 
cable, instruments and appliances, and all 
other real estate and fixtures and personal 
property owned, controlled, operated or 
managed in connection with or to facilitate 
communication by telephone whether such 
communication is had with or without the 
use of transmission wires. (Emphasis added.) 
The authority of the Public Service Commission and 
the definition of "public utility" is in § 54-2-1(29): 
The term "public utility" includes every 
. telephone corporation, where the 
serv:;_ce :;__o performed for . . the public 
genera~~" . And whenever any . 
telephone corporation . . performs a service 
for ... the public, ... for which any 
compensation or payment whatsoever is received, 
such . . telephone corporation . . . is 
hereby declared to be a public utility, subject 
to the jurisdiction and regulation of the 
commission and to the provisions of this title. 
This court has defined the test for public 
utility, in Medic-Call, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273 (1970), citing 73 C.J.S., 
Public Utilities, § 7b, as follows: 
Accordingly, a utility must act toward 
all members of the public impartially, and 
treat all alike; and it cannot arbitrarily 
select the persons for whom it will perform 
its service or furnish its commodity, or 
refuse to one a favor or privilege which it 
has extended to another, since the term 
"public utility" precludes the idea of 
service which is private in its nature and 
is not to be obtained by the public. 
Accord, Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., --P.2d-- (1978). 
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The Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
issued to appellant herein (Record,pp. 4-6) authorizes 
appellant to "acquire, maintain and operate facilities 
for a radio-telephone and paging common carrier public 
utility and to engage in the business of a common 
carrier." The order further states that such service 
shall be "between fixed control and base stations 
subject to the license requirements of the Federal 
Communications Commission." (Record, p. 6.) In 
addition, appellant is required to file his tariff 
of rates similar to the tariff in effect for the 
Salt Lake City, Provo, and Ogden areas, and appellant 
is required to "at all times render reasonable, 
adequate, efficient and continuous service in accordance 
with the certificate hereby issued 
p. 6.) 
(Record, 
In order to provide mobile telephone and 
paging service, appellant must locate and obtain a 
suitable site for a base station, which consists of 
a paging transmitter and mobile telephone transmitter 
and receiver, and an antenna. The equipment to be 
installed in Logan is a duplicate of equipment 
operating at eleven other base stations along the 
Wasatch Front and in eastern Utah, near Vernal. 
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(Transcript p. 13, lines 7-11.) The proposed 
frequencies for Logan would be the same used in 
the other service areas, expanding the service 
coverage for all other areas to include the Logan 
area, so that a Logan physician would receive a 
page signal while attending a function at the 
University Medical Center in Salt Lake City from 
a local telephone call in Logan, or an Ogden 
contractor~~-~~ r9ceive telephone calls to his 
mobile telephor.~ ac 3 job site in the Logan area. 
(Transcript, p. 13, lines 12-13; 357, lines 7-25; 
358, lines 1-17.) 
Without the base station site and equipment, 
appellant would be unable to offer his service to 
the public in the Cache Valley area, and it is 
appellant's opinion that there is not an economically 
feasible alternative site in Logan, other than the 
site sought herein, and that the particular site is 
absolutely necessary for appellant's responsibility 
under appellant's Certificate. 
lines 2-6.) 
(Transcript, p. 35, 
Under the provisions of § 78-34-4, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953), appellant meets the requirements therein: 
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Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) That the use to which it is to be applied 
is a use authorized by law; 
(2) That the taking is necessary to such use; and 
(3) If already appropriated to some public use, 
that the public use to which it is to be applied 
is a more necessary public use. 
The uses for which the right of eminent domain 
may be exercised are listed in § 78-34-1, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953), and include: 
(8) Telegraph, telephone, electric light 
and electric power lines, and sites for 
electric light and power plants. 
The trial court herein determined from the evidence 
that the telephone service provided by appellant is 
within the meaning of "telephone" as defined in 
Title 54, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), and that the 
appellant has the power of eminent domain under 
Title 78, Chapter 34, Utah Code Ann. (1953). (Record, 
p. 57.) 
The use to which the property herein is to 
be applied is a use which has been authorized by the 
Utah Public Service Commission after consideration 
of public need, pursuant to the previously cited 
states. The taking of a base station site in 
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furtherance of the communications services provided 
by appellant is necessary to meet such public need. 
In a proper case, the Courts may consider whether the 
particular taking is necessary as in Salt Lake 
County v. Ramoselli, ---P.2d--- (Utah, 1977). 
In the instant case, however, the Utah Public 
Service Conr:J::_s,o_=, :;as ;::reviously determined 
the particular publlc need in Logan, and appellant 
has taken all the steps and made the necessary 
decision to put the service into operation as 
authorized. 
The general rule regarding selection of the 
property to be taken is stated in 29A C.J.S. Eminent 
Domain §90 as follows: 
The particular property sought to be 
condemned by the grantee of the power of 
eminent domain must be necessary for the pro-
posed project, but its decision as to the 
necessity will not be disturbed by the 
courts, at least in the absence of fraud, 
bad faith, or abuse of discretion. 
Accord, Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah, 1975) 
(cited in §90). 
The rule is also stated in 1 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, § 4.11 as follows: 
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The overwhelming weight of authority makes 
clear beyond any possibility of doubt that the 
question of the necessity or expediency of a 
taking in eminent domain lies within the 
discretion of the legislature and is not a 
proper subject of judicial review. 
In accordance with the general principle, 
it has been held that the courts may not inquire 
into the question 
{l) whether there is any necessity for the 
taking, 
(2) whether there is any need for resorting 
to eminent domain in effecting such acquisitions, 
(3) whether the time is a fitting one, 
(4) whether there is a need for the property 
to the extent sought to be acquired, . . 
{5) whether there is any need for the 
particular estate sought to be condemned, 
The Utah case of Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon 
S.L.R. Co., 23 Utah 474, 484 (1901) states: 
. . It may be said to be a general rule that, 
unless a corporation exercising the power of 
eninent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty 
of oppression, its discretion in the selection 
of land will not be interferred with. With the 
degree of necessity or the extent which the 
property will advance the public purpose, the 
courts have nothing to do. When the use is public, 
the necessity or expediency of appropriating any 
particular property is not a subject of judicial 
cognizance. (Citations omitted.) 
The trial court erred in finding (Record, p. 130, 
Findings of Fact No. 7) that there were several other 
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alternative sites that would perform the service 
offered by appellant. The clear evidence presented 
by appellant was there it was economically unfeasible 
to provide service in the Logan area from more than 
one base site, and that to locate several transmitters 
in the area to effect the same coverage and penetration 
as the one site could give would make the cost of 
such service prohibitive. 
A. Weil, the primary consideration, of 
course, ls cost to the public. We cannot 
feasibly develop a site so expensive that 
the public themselves cannot afford to use the 
paging service or the mobile or portable 
[telephone] service we have to offer. 
(Transcript, p. 22, lines 2-6, testimony of 
plaintiff.) 
Q. If that site were not available, Mr. 
Williams, what alternative would there be, if any? 
A. Well, the site became unavailable to us, 
I think the first thing we'd have to do is 
reappraise whether reliable paging service could 
be given to the people of Logan. 
Q. And if that were possible how would 
that be done? 
A. Well, the first thing --
Q. Barring economic considerations. 
A. Well, technically what we'd have to do 
is probably install a number of transmitters, 
one I'd say to cover the city, another to 
cover portions of the surrounding area, and 
posslbly as many as three transmitters would be 
necessary. But the problem with this is the fact 
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that with more transmitters and more repeater 
sites and more control equipment for that 
increases the price to the customer. I would 
estimate it would cost between two and three 
times the amount of money that we are presently 
offering or would offer the service for. 
(Transcript, pp. 40-41, Questions by Mr. Lloyd, 
Answers by plaintiff.) 
Q. Do you know of any alternate sites that 
would be economically feasible for your company 
to put in in the Logan area? 
A. No, I do not. 
(Transcript, p. 99, lines 13-16, Questions by 
Mr. Lloyd, Answers by Byron Colton, manager 
for appellant.) 
Q. Well, then why do you claim that this is the 
only acceptable site? 
A. That location right there is the only one that 
does an adequate job of serving the community. 
(Transcript, p. 146, lines 1-4, Questions by 
Mr. Harris , Answers by Charles L. Johnson, 
appellant's chief engineer.) 
The appellant having established the need for 
the site, it was error for the trial court to admit 
speculation by witnesses that there could be satis-
factory alternative single sites, or for the court to 
find that ecomonically there could be satisfactory al-
ternative multiple sites. Not one witness produced by 
defendant or intervenor had any experience in the equipment or 
operation of a radio common carrier system presently 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 16 -
operated by appellant at numerous locations in Utah. 
Not one witness produced by defendant or intervenor 
had performed any kind of objective test using the type and 
caliber of equipment appellant operates in Utah. 
There was no evidence that appellant's system ever 
caused or is causing any actual radio-wave 
interference in the operation of extensive 
transmitting equipment base stations throughout 
the most populous areas of Utah. 
PO HIT II. INTERVENOR HAS NO STANDING TO 
CONTEST THE COMPLAINT OF APPELLANT. 
The trial court erroneously permitted intervenor 
to enter this action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-7 (1953) 
provides: 
All persons in occupation of, or having 
or claiming an interest in, any of the property 
described in the complaint, or in the damages 
for the taking thereof, though not named, may 
appear, plead and defend, each in respect to 
his own property or interest, or that claimed 
by him, in the same manner as if named in the 
complaint. 
Intervenor North Utah Community TV has no 
interest or estate in the property described in the 
complaint. It does have a large antenna approximately 
100 feet from the property sought for condemnation, 
and owns real property some 400 feet to the west and 
200 feet to the north of the site. (Defendant's Ex. 1; 
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Transcript, p. 306, lines 15-23.) 
This Court has refused to allow owners of 
adjoining property to intervene in condemnation 
actions without showing that the intervenor had 
a vested interest in the property being condemned. 
In State v. Tedesco, 4 U.2d 31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955), 
an owner of adjoining property filed a claim that 
his land would suffer damages if the land in question 
were condemned. This Court stated that the intervenor 
could prevail only if the facts clearly established 
that it had a "present, direct and real interest" 
in the land sought to be condemned by the state. 
In Tedesco both land owners planned to develop 
subdivisions and had agreed that there would be 
restrictive covenants on the land. 
Similarly, other jurisdictions have disallowed 
claims of adjoining property owners for intangible harm 
alleged to be caused by the establishment of the 
public use. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 163. For 
example, in City of Louisville v. Munro, 475 S.W.2d 
479 (Ky. 1971), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held 
that automobile noise and the mere presence of a 
municipal zoo next door was insufficient to establish 
any claim for damages, in the absence of showing 
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material interference with the ordinary physical comfort 
or reasonable use of the complaining neighbor's property. 
That court further stated that it was not aware of any 
case in which recovery was allowed where the alleged 
taking, injury or interference did not have physical 
aspects. 
POINT III. DEFENDANT HAS NO STANDING TO 
CONTEST CONDEMNATION ON BEHALF OF POSSIBLE 
FUTURE RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORS. 
The trial court erroneously found that 
the use of the particular site by appellant raises 
the likelihood that its installation would 
seriously interfere with television sets within 
the proposed subdivision within a distance of one-half 
mile. Defendant urged the trial court to deny the 
appellant's right to use the property herein on the 
grounds that it may interfere in future lot sales 
on the remainder of defendant's property. 
The clear testimony was that appellant operates 
within high density residential locations in other 
Utah locations without any interference of any kind. 
No complaint has ever been lodged against appellant 
with the governing authorities, the Utah Public Service 
Commission or the Federal Communications commission. 
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Transcript, pp. 19, lines 20-25; 20, lines 1-5, 19-23; 
59, lines 14-25; 60, lines 1-7; 71, lines 22-23; 73, lines 
7-9; 205.) All testimony introduced on this question 
of future residential interference by defendant was 
speculation on the part of experts in general radio 
experience who had no experience with any of appellant's 
equipment. (Transcript, pp. 231-232; 285-286.) 
The trial court's finding regarding future 
possible interference ignored defendant's own witnesses 
who described commercial radio broadcasting antennas 
within the City of Logan broadcasting daily within 
the residential areas at thousands of watts of effective 
radiated power, whereas appellant is limited to 500 
watts, effective radiated power. (Transcript, p. 
269, lines 22-25; 274, lines 10-23.) 
POINT III. APPROVAL OF SITE LOCATIONS AND 
QUESTIONS OF INTERFERENCE BETWEEN COMMON 
CARRIERS AND OTHER REGULATED RADIO CARRIERS 
IS SOLELY WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE F.C.C. 
The trial court denied appellant's right to 
condemn the particular site herein solely on the 
possibility of future radio wave interference with 
intervenor's system and televisions in future 
residential areas near the site herein, finding 
that there were alternative sites which would not 
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run any risk of interference with other public use 
facilities. (Findings of Fact 9, 10, Record p. 130.) 
This determination of the trial court was 
outside of its authority, as the question of radio 
wave use and interference is entirely pre-empted by 
federal law. The fundamental rationale for the 
Federal communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 
et seq., is based on the fact that the number of 
available radio frequencies is finite, and therefore, 
Congress must exercise its power over interstate 
commerce to allocate available frequencies and control 
their use. Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders 
Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940). 
Unquestionably, federal legislation has pre-empted 
local regulation of radio transmission, including 
assignment of frequencies, interference phenomena, and 
the content of broadcast material. Allen B. Dumont 
Laboratories Inc. v. Carroll, 86 F. Supp. 813, aff'd, 
184 F.2d 153, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929; United States 
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). Cited 
in Schroeder v. Municipal Ct of Los Cerritos, 141 Cal. 
Rptr. 85, 87 (Cal. App. 1977). 
It is stated in Schroeder, supra, at 88: 
By contrast, many detailed regulations govern 
the assignment of frequencies and the prevention 
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of interference phenomena (see e.g., 47 C.P.R. 
§§ 97.73, 97.131, 97.133), and there can be no 
doubt that federal regulation has pre-empted 
control in those areas. 
The power of the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) over radio common carriers, including appellant, 
and over cable television systems, including intervenor, 
is plenary insofar as assignment of frequencies and 
interference questions is concerned. Such power includes 
approval or disapproval of base station site locations. 
Appellant may not construct the site here in question 
without FCC approval in the form of a construction permit. 
Included in the FCC's determination is whether there are 
frequency or interference questions between appellant 
and other broadcasters or users, including intervenor. 
Such power over appellant is stated in American Tel. & Tel., 
Co. v. F. C. C., 572 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 1978): 
The FCC has a duty to "execute and enforce 
the provisions of" the Communications Act, 
47 U.S.C. § 151. The Communications Act 
requires that common carriers furnish service 
on reasonable request, 47 U.S.C. § 20l(a); 
that rates and practices be just, fair, reasonaole 
and nondiscriminatory, 47 U.S.C. §§ 20l(b), 202(a); 
that carriers file their tariffs with the FCC, 
47 U.S.C. § 203(a); that the FCC investigate 
complaints, 47 U.S.C. § 208; that carriers 
obtain certificates of public convenience and 
necessity before constructing, acquiring or 
operating any facilities or ter~inating any 
services, 47 U.S.C. § 214; that the FCC examine 
transactions that might affect rates or services, 
47 U.S.C. § 215; and that carriers submit 
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applications for proposed consolidations and 
mergers to the FCC, 47 U.S.C. § 222. We are 
aware of no authority for the proposition 
that the FCC may abdicate its responsibility 
to perform these duties and ensure that these 
statutory standards are met. 
Both appellant and intervenor are closely 
regulated by the regulations adopted by the FCC. 
Intervenor's technical operation is governed by parts 
76 and 78, 47 C.F.R., for cable television, CATV 
operations. Detailed technical regulations concerning 
CATV ampli::'-'-cat.c':r: and interference are located at 
47 C.F.R. §§ 76.601 et seq. (1977). Appellant is 
likewise subject to strict regulation as regards 
improper tuning and quality of equipment to prevent 
any interference with existing or projected conunercial 
or residential receivers, as provided in 47 C.F.R. 
§§ 21.500 et seq. (1977). 
There were sharp differences in the testimony 
adduced at the trial in this matter regarding whether 
there would be any interference generated from 
appellant's site. Appellant objected to the speculative 
testimony of intervenor and defendant's witnesses as 
to possible interference concerns, particularly where 
such witnesses had no experience in radio conunon 
carrier equipment or operations. It is appellant's 
position that, absent some showing of interference from 
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the numerous base station sites in Utah in operation for 
many years throughout the major metropolitan areas in 
Utah and closer in proximity to many commercial receivers 
similar to the cable television receiver operated by 
intervenor, that the issue of interference is reserved 
solely to the FCC which has the expertise to make such 
determinations, and which, by law, has primary jurisdiction 
over such questions of location of transmitting equipment, 
the specifications of such equipment, and the assignment 
of operating frequencies. 
The inappropriateness of the trial court's attempting 
to evaluate the technical testimony reserved by law to 
the FCC is illustrated in the court's comments during 
the course of the trial: 
I have no expertise at all in this field, 
and I have to depend on what you people are 
telling me about it. (Tr. p. 254, lines 1-2.) 
I do want to review the notes that I've 
taken because I do have certainly some 
consternation, as one of the counsel put it, 
in connection with the facts that have been 
put before this court, and I certainly think 
in a field like this that the only thing I 
know about communications, I either turn on 
a knob or lift up a receiver, and that's 
about it. So it does certainly cause me some 
problems in analyzing it, and I'll give my 
attention to it and get it to you as soon as 
I can. (Tr. p. 372, lines 15-24.) 
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The testimony from intervenor was contradicted 
as to whether there was a real question of any 
interference. h'hen appellant first located the site 
in question, he met with the President of defendant, 
the owner of the property, to discuss purchasing the 
property for the use indicated herein. Mr. Gibbons 
indicated he would sell the property if the 
Community TV people had no objection. The CATV engineer, 
Kent Gardner, c1er-. came to the site with appellant, 
appellant's manager, and Mr. Gibbons. After describing 
the proposed use, antenna and frequencies, Mr. Gardner 
stated he could see no objection to the use of the 
site. (Tr. Pp. 35, lines 7-25; 36-39; 40, lines 1-6; 
98, lines 12-25; 99, lines 1-12.) Mr. Gardner 
testified for intervenor on other matters, but did 
not deny the prior admission. (Tr. 308-314.) 
The Court permitted an opinion by Boyd 
Humphries, a witness for intervenor who had no 
experience with appellant's proposed equipment, 
as to the probability of interference from appellant's 
base station transmissions to the Channel 6 of the 
CATV system, which he estimated to be 8 to 10 on a 
scale of 10, with 10 being the highest probability, 
over appellant's objection. (Tr. p. 320, lines 4-25, 
p. 321, lines 1-5.) When pressed on cross examination, 
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as to how far a theoretical interfering signal would 
be able to travel from appellant's transmitter, Mr. 
Humphries could not answer what signal strength a 
theoretical interfering signal would have based upon 
the specifications of the proposed equipment because 
he did not know what the quality of the antenna would 
be, and he admitted that it was common practice to 
solve such a theoretical problem with inexpensive 
filters. (Tr. p. 325, lines 6-25; 326; and 327, lines 
1-14.) 
In contradiction of intervenor's speculative 
testimony, appellant's engineers described other 
broadcasting sites in Utah, using identical equipment 
with that proposed for Logan, transmitting continuously 
within several feet of receivers having the same 
receiving function as the CATV antenna in Logan, 
with no interference. (Tr. pp. 18, lines 12-25; 
19; 97, lines 18-25; 98, lines 1-11; 67, lines 8-25; 
68, 1-11.) In addition, appellant's electronics 
engineers continuously monitor transmission equipment 
for spurious or harmonic emissions. None have 
occurred. (Tr. pp. 204, lines 6-19, 23-25; 205, lines 
8-25; 206.) Further, if, after tests are run with 
the actual equipment, an unexpected interference 
problem arises on a frequency, uncorrected by adjustments, an 
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alternative frequency could be obtained from the FCC. 
(Tr. p. 328.) 
Appellant testified extensively concerning the 
tools available to insure that the transmitting 
equipment does not disturb any other equipment in the 
area, including shielding the antenna, filtering the 
equipment, and carefully analysing the signals 
generated as the system is placed into operation for 
s~ur~c_s ern1ssions or harmonic distortions which are 
not supposed to be present with the caliber of 
equipment used by appellant. Both witnesses for 
intervenor and defendant admitted that such techniques 
are available and common. (Tr. pp. 328; 338, lines 
6-11. Tr. pp. 340, lines 15-25; 341-345.) 
The recitation of the conflicts in the testimony 
and the degree of technical evidence admitted by the 
court demonstrates the wisdom of Congress investing 
in the FCC, as a technical administrative agency, the 
exclusive jurisdiction over interference and frequency 
assignment. Federal control over technical matters 
such as frequency allocation to radio stations is 
exclusive. Head v. New Mexico Bd of Examiners in 
Optometry, 374 U.S. 424,430 n.6 (1963). 
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The technical determinations that are made by 
the FCC are illustrated in the complicated regulations 
promulgated by that agency, and the technical decisions 
published in the FCC Reports, now in its second series. 
An example of the question of frequency assignment and 
the multiple use of the frequency bands in harmony 
discussed in the testimony in the trial court over 
appellant's objections, is contained in a lengthy 
technical order, In Re Frequency Bands Land Mobile 
Service, 51 F.C.C.2d 945 (1975), and cited in 
National Assoc. of Regulatory Utility Comm. v. FCC, 
525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. den., 425 U.S. 992 
(1976). In National Assoc. the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit, held that the determinations as to the 
extent of the allocation of frequency spectrum to the 
development of a nationwide, broadband cellular mobile 
radio communications system are the sort that Congress 
intended to leave to the broad discretion of the FCC 
by imposing a broad public convenience, interest, or 
necessity standard. 
The trial court stepped beyond its authority in 
substituting its judgment as to the alternatives and 
necessities available to appellant, as that decision is 
exclusively the domain of the FCC or the Utah Public 
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Service commission. The use is clearly a public use. 
The necessity of the use has already been determined 
by the Utah Public Service commission. The necessity 
of the particular site has been determined by 
appellant through a process of careful analysis 
and study. Appellant has not acted in bad faith or 
in an oppressive manner. Appellant is not taking 
anything from intervenor directly, as intervenor has 
no ownership in the property in question. Intervenor 
has suo~:~~e~ .cself to the jursidiction of the FCC 
and operates under an FCC permit and license at the 
Logan site. It is the FCC which must determine whether 
there is any merit to intervenor's contentions 
regarding interference. Such a determination cannot be 
made until appellant secures a site which is suitable 
in his opinion for the purposes of his Certificate. 
The ruling of the trial court denying the 
appellant this particular site should be reversed and the 
case remanded with directions to proceed with the 
unresolved issues of temporary use and value. The 
need in Logan exists for the service of the appellant 
and,in some cases, is a matter of life itself where 
physicians require such communications services. 
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Dated this 11th day of December, 1978. 
Walter P. Faber, Jr 
David Lloyd 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-4491 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed three copies each 
of the within Brief of Appellant to Mr. B. H. Harris, 
attorney for Defendant-Respondent, Harris, Preston & 
Gutke, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah 84321, and 
Mr. L. Brent Hoggan, attorney for Invervenor-Respondent, 
Olson, Hoggan & Sorenson, 56 West Center Street, Logan, 
Utah 84321, postage prepaid, this 11th day of 
December, 1978. 
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